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The Deterrent Effect of Voting Against Minarets: 
Identity Utility and Foreigners’ Location Choice* 
 
This paper uses the vote on the Swiss minaret initiative as a natural experiment to identify 
the causal effect of negative attitudes towards immigrants on foreigners’ location choices and 
thus indirectly on their utility. Based on a regression discontinuity design with unknown 
discontinuity points and administrative data on the population of foreigners, we find that the 
probability of their moving to a municipality that unexpectedly expressed strong reservations 
decreases initially by about 60 percent. The effect levels off over a period of about 5 months. 
Consistent with a reduction in the identity utility for immigrants in general, the reaction is not 
confined to Muslims, whereby high-skilled foreigners seem to be most sensitive to the newly 
revealed reservations. 
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1 Introduction
The question of whether people care how they are perceived by others is important for
understanding individual decision-making as many choices involve aspects of social inter-
action. This obviously holds for bonding decisions, but it also applies to people’s choice
of organization where they wish to work or spend their leisure time. The issue also arises
when people decide about the community they want to live in. To what extent are the
resident population’s attitudes relevant for such decisions? By analyzing how foreigners
react to unexpectedly revealed reservations towards their group, we illuminate the role of
identity utility in location choices.
Attitudes towards foreigners influence the interaction between immigrants and the native
population. This matters for the successful realization of gains from trade between these
two parties as well as for the migrants’ integration (see, e.g., the review on cultural
integration by Algan et al., 2012). Specifically, a host countrie’s culture of welcome might
affect where mobile foreigners are willing to locate, and is crucial for regions that need to
attract experts from abroad. There is a large body of literature which discusses the sources
and expression of negative attitudes towards foreigners as reflected, for example, in right-
wing extremism (e.g., Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). However, foreigners’ behavioral
reactions to these attitudes and the consequences that they have for their welfare are
less often addressed. While economic models and analyses of foreigners’ location choices
offer an approach to learn about foreigners’ valuations of the overall attractiveness of
an environment, this field of research typically neglects the political attitudes of the
resident population. Over and above, the attempt to analyze the relationship between the
presence of foreigners and residents’ attitudes towards them poses a severe methodological
challenge: an inherent simultaneity bias (Dustmann and Preston, 2001). On the one hand,
the presence of foreigners may affect natives’ preferences and attitudes. Getting to know
foreigners may reduce prejudices, as postulated by the so-called contact hypothesis, or the
presence of foreigners may aggravate negative attitudes, as natives fear pressure on the
labor market and the welfare system, expect a rise in the crime rate or the alienation of
their own culture. On the other hand, attitudes of natives towards foreigners may affect
the presence of immigrants. Foreigners probably move less to areas where residents have
reservations about them, where they fear discrimination or even physical abuse.
In this paper, we analyze the role of attitudes towards foreigners in their choice of resi-
dence based on a unique setting which allows us to address the identification problem of
simultaneity. We integrate identity utility, as introduced by Akerlof and Kranton (2000),
in a model of location choice to capture the idea that perceived negative attitudes towards
foreigners affect their utility. The model predictions are empirically tested exploiting a
quasi-experimental setting for Switzerland. In a national ballot, citizens voted on whether
the further construction of minarets in Switzerland should be prohibited (the so-called
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minaret initiative). Against the recommendation of the Federal Assembly and the predic-
tions of leading opinion pollsters, the amendment to the Swiss constitution was accepted
with a clear majority. The ballot outcome manifested reservations and anti-immigrant
attitudes in regions of Switzerland which had previously been hidden. There were munic-
ipalities where voters unexpectedly deviated strongly from their past voting behavior on
migration-related issues. We exploit this fact and study whether the inflow of foreigners
to these particular municipalities declined in the aftermath of the vote, which would be
consistent with lower expected utility and evidence that individuals react to perceived
attitudes towards their social category.
The empirical analysis draws on administrative data for the universe of foreigners living in
Switzerland which allow us to study their moving behavior before and after the national
vote on the minaret initiative. Based on a simple simulation study, we expect the effect,
if it exists, to materialize as a sharp decline in the probability that a foreigner would
choose to move to a municipality that had unexpectedly revealed its reservations towards
foreigners some time after the vote. Since the point in time at which the effect can be
observed is not deterministically predictable, the change in moving patterns is analyzed
based on a regression discontinuity design with unknown discontinuity points (Porter and
Yu, 2015). We find such discontinuous jumps in the moving pattern of foreigners in several
cantons. We observe that foreigners are deterred from locating to municipalities that
unexpectedly revealed negative attitudes towards them. The estimated effect is sizable.
The probability that a foreigner chooses one of these municipalities drops, on average, by
about 8 percentage points relative to a pre-intervention level of thirteen percent, and thus
by about 60 percent. Several validation checks suggest that the assumptions underlying
the RDD are valid; neither the number of foreigners moving nor the municipalities that
unexpectedly reveal their reservations about immigrants are systematically different before
and after the threshold dates. The effect holds to a similar extent for groups of foreigners
other than Muslims. This suggests that foreigners identify with the specific minorities who
are restricted and that they perceived the support for the initiative as being a general
expression of negative attitudes towards them. Still, the effect differs across specific groups
of foreigners and over time. While it is substantial for first generation foreigners, there is
no discernible effect for second generation foreigners. The latter are often well assimilated
and seem to be less affected by the revealed attitudes. This latter finding emerges from
testing a potential alternative explanation that landlords will dare to discriminate more
against foreigners once they learn about the reservations of their fellow citizens. This
supply-driven reaction, however, would affect foreigners in general. We further find that
foreigners in high-skill occupations react more than foreigners in low-skill occupations.
The effect fades after about 5 months. This might be due to the lower salience of the
issue after the elapse of some time and/or due to an adjustment in the housing market.
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In the latter case, lower rents compensate foreigners for the disutility of living in an
environment with negative attitudes towards them.
Our analysis contributes to several strands of literature. First, there is a growing literature
on the economics of identity which builds on the seminal work of Akerlof and Kranton
(2000). In research on the integration of foreigners, an emphasis is on whether immigrants
see themselves more or less as members of the host society. Respective studies explore how
this aspect of foreigners’ identity is related to economic outcomes (see, e.g., Dustmann,
1996; Casey and Dustmann, 2010; Georgiadis and Manning, 2013). In a lab experiment,
Mechtel et al. (2014) study identity utility based on people’s group choices. In our analysis,
we derive evidence on identity utility from observed decision-making regarding the choice
of residency.
Second, our study also contributes to the growing literature on the interdependent rela-
tionship between the presence of immigrants and attitudes towards them.
Regarding the effects of an inflow of foreigners on the attitudes of the native popula-
tion, several studies take the potential reverse causality into account and try to solve
the identification problem by instrumental variables (IV) strategies. In pioneering work,
Dustmann and Preston (2001) analyze the effect of the local ethnic composition on na-
tives’ attitudes towards foreigners in the UK. They propose an IV approach by using the
ethnic composition of broader areas as an instrument for the composition in local areas.
In their study, the simultaneity bias matters and correcting for it reveals that a higher
share in the (ethnic) minority population leads to more hostile attitudes in the majority
population. The same strategy is, for example, applied in Dill (2013) to explore the ef-
fect of the presence of immigrants on right-wing extremism in Germany. In a study for
Switzerland, Kuhn and Brunner (2014) make use of this approach to measure the effect of
the foreign population in Swiss municipalities on voting behavior in national referendums
on migration issues. They find that a larger fraction - in particular of culturally distant
- foreigners is related to lower support for laws which propose more lenient rulings on
migration practices. Another strand of studies uses an IV strategy initially suggested
by Card (2001) to analyze the effect of immigration on the labor market. This strategy
is based on the idea that immigrants tend to move to regions where immigrants of the
same ethnicity are already present, and thus use the historical migration pattern as an
instrument for current immigration (see, e.g., Barone et al., 2014; Méndez Martínez and
Cutillas, 2014; Halla et al., 2014). Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008) study how an increase in
the population’s share of immigrants affects election outcomes using exogeneous variation
in the share of immigrants due to the government’s placement practice for asylum seekers
in Denmark. They find that the support for anti-immigrant parties increases and that
the most pro-immigrant party loses votes.
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These studies, having taken the potential endogeneity into account find, overall, that
attitudes towards foreigners become more negative with a higher fraction of foreigners
in the local population. They also indicate that endogeneity seems to play a role, thus
suggesting that attitudes could be an influencing factors in immigrants’ location choices.
To the best of our knowledge, there are five studies that are concerned with the ques-
tion of whether foreigners’ location choices react to attitudes towards them. An analysis
by Tolnay and Beck (1992) documents the relationship between racial violence in U.S.
counties and the outmigration of the threatened group between 1910 and 1930. In re-
lated work, Henry (2009) finds that African Americans are less likely to move to places
where they face a higher risk of becoming a victim of a hate crime. While these two
studies focus on actual violence, we concentrate on the effect of negative attitudes which
are expressed in an otherwise tranquil environment. Waisman and Larsen (2008) use a
quasi-random variation in the placement of asylum seekers in Sweden to investigate the
welfare consequences of negative attitudes towards foreigners. They use attitude measures
based on survey data and find some evidence that immigrants’ location choice is influ-
enced by natives’ attitudes and that negative attitudes are associated with lower wages.
They attribute their findings to labor market discrimination. Damm (2009) investigates
regional factors of migrants’ location choices in Denmark. She also uses a quasi-random
placement of asylum seekers and finds that the hazard to leave the assigned municipality
rises sharply with the share of votes for right-wing parties. She does not attribute this
finding to negative attitudes per se, but to the welfare-seeking behavior of immigrants
that is hampered by right-wing parties which seek to restrict welfare for immigrants. The
most recent study is by Gorinas and Pytliková (2013) who investigate whether attitudes
towards immigrants have an impact on migration flows on an international level. They
perform a cross-national study and find that the surveyed dismissive attitudes of natives
are negatively correlated with migrant inflows. Thereby migrants from OECD countries
are the most adversely affected group in their study.
While these five studies indicate that negative attitudes potentially affect minorities’ loca-
tion choices, negative attitudes are either only inferred and/or their potential endogeneity
is not accounted for.
In our work, we pursue a novel strategy and measure attitudes towards immigrants directly
by ballot data from national referendums. These voiced attitudes are policy-relevant and
are less likely to be biased by socially desirable answers than survey responses. Moreover,
attitudes expressed in the context of a ballot can be clearly observed and interpreted by
the public.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background
information on the institutional setting as well as on the informational conditions defining
the municipalities that unexpectedly reveal a shift towards an anti-immigration position.
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Section 3 formalizes our idea how perceived attitudes influence an individuals’ utility
and how this affects his or her location choice. Based on these considerations, Section 4
outlines the empirical strategy. Our data source is described in Section 5, and the results
are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Background and Informational Setting
At the center of our study, there is information about individual voting behavior in a
national referendum that is used to infer residents’ revealed attitudes towards foreigners
and the change of these publicly visible attitudes over time. In order to understand this
specific informational setting, we first provide some background information about the
specific proposition and direct democratic decision-making in Switzerland. In a second
step, we explain the circumstances in voting behavior that are considered an unexpected
revelation of reservations towards foreigners. Finally, we discuss how the ballot outcome
entered foreigners’ information base.
2.1 The vote on the minaret initiative
On November 29, 2009, a majority of Swiss voters approved an initiative that banned
the further construction of minarets in Switzerland.1 Swiss citizens are accustomed to
expressing their opinions at the poll. Direct democratic decision-making is very common
in Switzerland, even at the national level. Citizens openly discuss the proposals and can
rely on being provided with ample coverage of the issues in the media. Newspapers,
for example, publish the statements and voting recommendations of political parties and
opinion leaders. Frey (1994) analyses the role of public discussion in the process of direct
democratic decision-making, with an emphasis on the Swiss experience.
In the aftermath of 9/11 with its increased fear of terrorism, a discussion arose about
whether practicing Muslims in Switzerland would threaten the democratic order. In this
anxious atmosphere, two Swiss centre-right conservative parties, i.e. the Swiss People’s
Party and the Federal Democratic Union, started preparations for the minaret initiative
against the further construction of minarets. The required number of signatures was
collected by July 8, 2008, and the initiative was officially submitted on July 29, 2008.
1The Swiss direct democratic system, among other things, allows the electorate to propose amendments
to the federal constitution by launching a so-called popular initiative. Initiators have to collect 100,000
valid signatures amounting to about two percent of the population of Swiss citizens. Once this hurdle is
overcome, voters decide in a national referendum on whether the constitution should be changed. This is
the case if the initiative is approved by the majority of voters overall as well as in a majority of cantons.
If this holds, the federal government is obliged to implement the will of the majority. For an overview
about the Swiss political system, see, for example, Linder (2010).
5
At this point in time, there were only four minarets in the whole of Switzerland. For
their construction a permit was necessary, requiring that the construction plans comply
with the cantonal and communal rules. Due to these existing restrictions, it was not to
be expected that many minarets would be built in Switzerland. It was also clear that
the proposed amendment would not change anything in the religious practice of Swiss
Muslims. Mosques were already present and their right to exist was not affected by the
initiative.
During the campaign and beyond, the initiative was widely discussed in the Swiss media
and attracted global attention. While supporters argued that minarets have a political
dimension, as they represent an Islamic religious and political symbol of power and that
their presence might thus endanger Swiss democracy, opponents equated minarets with
steeples and questioned whether their prohibition would be compatible with human rights
and freedom of religion. The degree of public attention that this issue attracted can partly
be ascribed to the campaign advertisement. The initiative’s campaign poster showed a
woman in a black niqab and the Swiss flag with looming minarets representing rockets (see
Figure B.4 in the Appendix). The Federal Commission against Racism judged that this
visual tactic would jeopardize public peace and therefore banned it from being displayed
in some towns and cantons.2 This dispute aggravated the tensions between supporters
and opponents, as the faction backing the ban believed it to be necessary, whereas those
against the ban saw it as censorship and a restriction of the freedom of speech. Overall,
the campaign raised fundamental discussions about religious freedom, cultural diversity
and tolerance in Switzerland and was very salient in the media. The discussion was
not limited to Muslims in Switzerland, but also involved the issue of migration and the
treatment of minorities in general.
Most parties and the Swiss Federal Assembly recommended that the initiative be rejected.
However, contrary to general expectations as well as the forecasts of leading opinion
researchers that the initiative would not pass, it was accepted with a clear majority of
57.5 percent of the votes. Specific minority rights were thus restricted in a constitutional
amendment. The decision came into effect at the national level and no minarets have
been built since then. In the exercise of their religion, however, nothing has changed for
Muslims in Switzerland.
2.2 Attitudes towards foreigners across municipalities
The acceptance of the initiative did not only come as a surprise, but the voting pattern
across municipalities did not match the rather stable political spectrum of views on migra-
tion manifested in past initiatives. There were municipalities that unexpectedly revealed
2The campaign poster was, for example, forbidden in Basel, Freiburg, Lausanne, Morges, Neuenburg,
Nyon, and Yverdon.
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anti-immigrant attitudes, which were not known to external observers until then. We
thus see the event as an exogenous shock in perceived attitudes towards foreigners.
The vote on the minaret initiative provides a particularly attractive setting to capture
information about citizens’ attitudes. It can be conceptualized as a low-cost decision in-
volving virtually no instrumental considerations about economic consequences, but rather
allowing fully expressive voting behavior. Previous votes like the initiative "for the regu-
lation of immigration" held on September 24, 2000, provoked serious concerns about neg-
ative economic repercussions in case of an approval. The voting behavior on the minaret
initiative thus revealed rather undiluted signals about attitudes towards foreigners and
allows us to measure potential changes in the publicly visible positioning of municipalities,
i.e., changes relative to the best approximation as derived from previous voting behav-
ior. Importantly, the conditions to get representative information about attitudes across
space are the same for the people in our study as for us the researchers. We consider the
changes in perceived attitudes as exogenous. The outcome is not anticipated and reveals
new information. Information, which foreigners can incorporate in their perception about
the political orientation of people across municipalities.
In order to use the exogenous shock to measure the effect of perceived attitudes on for-
eigners’ location choices, we identify the municipalities that revealed previously unknown
preferences based on a comparison with relevant votes in the past. In particular, we rely
on four votes that occurred within a time frame close to the minaret initiative and which
are sufficiently contextually related to it, i.e., in that they also involve the expression of
attitudes towards foreigners. We code the voting results such that a higher vote share
reflects more restrictive attitudes towards migration and foreigners. These votes include
(i) the initiative "For the regulation of immigration" ("Initiative für eine Regelung der
Zuwanderung") held on September 24, 2000 (ii) the initiative "Against the abuse of the
asylum law" ("Initiative gegen Asylrechtsmissbrauch") held on November 24, 2002 (iii)
the referendum on "The federal decree regarding the regular naturalization and the easier
naturalization of young, and second-generation foreigners" ("Referendum zum Bundes-
beschluss über die ordentliche Einbürgerung sowie über die erleichterte Einbürgerung
junger Ausländerinnen und Ausländer der zweiten Generation") held on September 26,
2004 and (iv) the referendum on "The federal decree about the acquisition of citizenship
rights by third-generation foreigners" ("Referendum zum Bundesbeschluss über die or-
dentliche Einbürgerung sowie über erleichterte Einbürgerung junger Ausländerinnen und
Ausländer der dritten Generation") also held on September 26, 2004.
Specifically, a municipality is characterized as having unexpectedly revealed negative at-
titudes towards foreigners if the following criteria are fulfilled:
• The average support for restrictive migration policies in the past lies below the mean
of the canton they belong to.
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• The swing to a more restrictive position, as expressed in the vote on the minaret
initiative, is larger than the mean change of all the municipalities within the canton.
• The support for the minaret initiative exceeds 50% of the municipality’s active
electorate.
We label these municipalities with the generic term "switcher municipalities".
The first criterion is motivated by the idea that the respective municipalities were per-
ceived as being relatively tolerant up to the vote on the minaret initiative. The second
criterion ensures that only municipalities which experienced a large shift are considered
to be switchers, given that nearly all the municipalities shifted to the right. The third
criterion guarantees that the municipality voted in favor of the minaret initiative thus
providing a signal that the majority agrees with the proposition. The latter point is
important for the media coverage (see below). Based on these three criteria, we classify
approximately 24 percent of all municipalities in Switzerland as switchers.3 The following
graphs in Figure 1 show how the voting results are distributed when comparing switcher
and non-switcher municipalities. Descriptive statistics on the criteria are reported in Ta-
ble B.2. First, citizens in switcher municipalities voted less restrictive on migration issues
in former votes (used to calculate the ex ante perceived level of critical attitudes towards
foreigners). Second, however, in the minaret initiative municipalities from the two groups
cast similarly restrictive votes, on average. Third, when focusing on the change in the
support of a restrictive position towards migration, a larger difference is observed for
switcher municipalities than for non-switcher municipalities.
In a supplementary analysis, we, moreover, check whether the switcher municipalities
merely became more similar to the municipalities that expressed stronger reservations in
former votes. As a generally large fraction of the voting population approved a restrictive
position in the minaret initiative, it could well be that the relative positioning of the
municipalities in terms of expressed reservations has not changed at all. Accordingly, we
rank municipalities within their cantons, once with regard to their average yes vote share
in the four migration-related propositions that took place before the minaret initiative,
and once on the basis of the vote outcomes in the minaret initiative. Figure 2 shows the
average rank changes for switcher and non-switcher municipalities in all Swiss cantons. A
positive change indicates that the municipality increased its rank by expressing a relatively
more restrictive position towards immigration. A clear picture emerges that switcher
municipalities gained in rank and non-switcher municipalities lost in rank. The relative
strength of expressed reservations towards foreigners has thus changed between switcher
and non-switcher municipalities.
3Please note that other reasonable definitions classify mostly the same municipalities as switchers and
thus which particular criteria are used does not qualitatively change our results.
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Vote outcome in 2009
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Figure 1: Voting outcomes in switcher and non-switcher municipalities
2.3 Information dissemination
In the aftermath of the unexpected approval of the minaret initiative, there was sub-
stantial post-election news coverage. On all the Swiss media channels, the unreckoned
outcome was discussed and the municipal voting patterns made prominent news. Most
Swiss newspapers presented maps indicating which municipalities of a canton supported
or rejected the initiative. Sometimes, even the vote district results were discussed and
displayed.4 For Swiss citizens and foreigners alike, it was easy to learn about attitudes
across municipalities and to spread the word about the municipalities that were expressing
more pronounced reservations towards foreigners.
4Figures B.5 and B.6 in Appendix B provide examples of maps displaying the outcome where approval
is marked green and rejection is marked red.
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indicates that the involved municipalities voted more restrictively on migration in the minaret
initiative than in previous votes (compared to the other municipalities in a cantonal ranking).
The rank change is measured as a percentage of the number of municipalities within the canton.
3 Theory
To derive our main hypothesis and to point out important conditions for identification,
we formalize our ideas in a simple location choice model that takes identity utility into
account. We explicitly restrict our model to the location choice and take the decision to
move as given. Thus, we model the choices of individuals once they have decided that they
will move and face a continuum of municipalities and their characteristics in their choice
set. We argue that their decision to move is much less affected by the new information
about attitudes towards foreigners than their decision about where to move. First, the
decision to move is much more costly than a change in the decision about where to
move. Second, individuals residing in municipalities for which negative attitudes towards
foreigners are disclosed might have already been aware of their neighbours’ attitudes and
would know that nothing had really changed. We test this supposition in a supplementary
empirical analysis (see Section 6.5) and do not find systematic reactions to the vote
outcome in the decisions to move.
We start this section by setting out the equilibrium conditions for foreigners’ choices
between municipalities when they want to move; here, we evaluate choices in terms of
utility losses from ostracism and the feeling of being unwelcome. We then derive our
main hypothesis about how changes in perceived attitudes towards foreigners affect their
moving behavior. In order to understand the preconditions for a test of the hypothesis,
we simulate how new information about attitudes is incorporated and reflected in the
observed aggregate moving behavior.
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3.1 Location choice including identity utility
To model location choices of foreigners, we assume that the economy is in equilibrium and
that individuals take municipality characteristics as given when choosing their location.
Foreigners are a minority, and their decisions influence neither the wage level, as it is
driven by the majority, nor the equilibrium for housing prices, in the short run.
The utility Ui,j,t of an individual i (i = 1, ..., n) living in municipality j (j = 1, .., J) at
time t depends on several municipality characteristics Cj,t and individual characteristics
Idi,t. Municipality characteristics that influence individual utility are taxes T , housing
prices p, the provision of public goods g, but also natural beauty or social ties. Individ-
ual characteristics involve an individual’s income, the preference for housing, and other
individual characteristics such as family status. An individual’s utility from residing in
j in t is thus defined as Ui,j,t(Cj,t; ...; Idi,t), whereby we abstain from defining a specific
functional form. We use standard assumptions concerning marginal utilities and marginal
rates of substitution, assuring that households can be compensated for higher values of
variables they dislike by lower values of others of the same type. For example, a tax rise
can be compensated by a drop in housing prices.
In order to capture that individuals’ utility might be affected by the perceived attitudes
of others, we model an individual’s utility as dependent on his or her identity. People
have a sense of self and care about how they perceive themselves as human beings and
how they are perceived by others. In our specific application, we aim at identifying the
effect of a negative change in perceived attitudes towards an individual’s social group or
category, i.e., being a foreigner.
In social psychology, it is well documented that perceiving even slightly repellent behav-
ior of others can produce psychological and physical distress. Investigations on ostracism
show that individuals strongly react to perceived exclusion, as it threatens the fundamen-
tal needs of belonging and increases negative affect. For example, regions of the brain that
are important for pain detection are activated. Moreover, individuals are highly sensitive
in detecting situations of exclusion (see, e.g., Williams, 2009; Williams and Nida, 2011).
We follow the seminal work on the economics of identity by Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
to define central aspects of a person’s identity utility. In particular, identity utility Ii
depends on i’s action ai, on the actions of others a−i, and on the assigned social category
ci, i.e., Ii = Ii(ai, a−i, ci).5 The actions of others which, in our case, focus on the revealed
attitudes of natives can differ across municipalities j and in time t. We define the utility
function, its derivatives, and marginal rates of substitution as follows:
Ui,j,t(Cj,t; ...; Idi,t; Ii,j,t)
5For our application, we can abstract from the extent to which an individual’s attributes match the
ideals of his or her social category and actions match prescriptions on how to behave.
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∂U
∂T
< 0;
∂U
∂p
< 0;
∂U
∂g
> 0;
∂U
∂I
> 0
MRSI;T :=
dI
dT
> 0;MRSI;p :=
dI
dp
> 0;MRSI;g :=
dI
dg
< 0.
I can take on positive values or negative ones to capture the possible disutility from
living in a municipality. Individuals can be compensated for lower identity utility by
advantageous values of other relevant factors. We restrict the social category ci to a one-
dimensional continuous measure between ci = 0 (native) and ci = 1 (foreigner). The
assignment to a particular category depends on individuals’ subjective perception.
We do not make any specific assumption about how the various factors influence I except
for the behavior of others a−i,j,t. We assume that individuals update their information
about their set of choices at the level of municipalities when they move. Moreover, the
behavior of the people in a municipality towards an individual’s social category can be
approximated as a−i,j,t = a−i,j,t(ci ∗ atj,t), i.e., as a function of the social category c and
atj,t, which describes the municipalities’ attitudes towards the social category of individual
i. The value of atj,t ranges between 0 and 1 where 0 stands for rather positive or neutral
attitudes and 1 for rather negative or hostile attitudes towards people with higher values
of ci.
∂I
∂at
< 0 and thus → ∂U
∂at
< 0.
In sum, the more negative the attitudes towards someone’s social group are, the less
identity utility he or she will draw from living in a particular municipality.6 We assume
that individuals regularly update their perceptions of atj,t based on the past voting record
of the municipalities’ taking into account votes related to their social category. Thus, atj,t
is a function of past vote outcomes v¯j,t. Overall, the framework includes the possibility
that individuals’ utility is affected by the revealed preferences of the voting population in
their place of residence, and accordingly that this influences the utility of locating in a
particular municipality.
3.2 Changes in perceived attitudes and moving decisions
Revealed attitudes towards foreigners in a municipality may change over time and thus
also individuals’ optimal location choices. Individuals choose their location such that their
utility is maximized within their choice set. Thus, individual i will choose to locate in
municipality j if, and only if,
Ui,j,t > Ui,k,t for all k 6= j,
6Related evidence based on panel data in Germany shows that higher vote shares of right-wing parties
are associated with lower reported life satisfaction for immigrants (Knabe et al., 2013).
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the utility to live there is higher than in all other municipalities in the choice set.
We will later compare the location choice of individuals around a point in time. We assume
that the location choice of individuals is in equilibrium before t and that new information
about attitudes across municipalities (atj,t) is revealed between t and t + 1, thus leading
individuals to update their utility expectations. In our specific setting, the newly revealed
information will be the voting outcome on the minaret initiative in Switzerland. This new
information can be seen as an exogenous change in at, as it was absolutely unexpected.
Thus, if an individual who would have chosen j in t, chooses a different municipality k in
t+ 1, the following should hold.
Ui,j,t > Ui,k,t for all k 6= j, (1)
as the individual has chosen municipality j in t, but
Ui,j,t+1 < Ui,k,t+1 for at least one k 6= j, (2)
as the individual chooses another municipality in t+ 1.
Thus, municipality j has become relatively less attractive:
Ui,t+1,k
Ui,t+1,j| {z }
>1 from (2)
>
Ui,t,k
Ui,t,j| {z }
<1 from (1)
,
either because the utility to live in j has fallen from t to t + 1, or the utility to live in k
has risen; or both.
There are two crucial conditions that need to hold in order to ascribe a potential change
in the location choice to the change in perceived local attitudes towards the social group c.
I. Municipality characteristics have not changed systematically between t and t + 1
(Cj,t = Cj,t+1 = Cj).
II. Moving individuals are, on average, the same in t and t+1. Thus, individual-specific
characteristics have not changed systematically between t and t+1 (Idi,t = Idi,t+1 =
Idi).
Given that these conditions hold, the only component in the utility function that could
have changed the relative attractiveness of municipality j is the identity utility from
perceived attitudes (atj,t) towards an individual’s social category ci.7 Thus, a systematic
change in the location choice can be attributed to a change in perceived attitudes.
7Please note that the two conditions are close to the identifying assumptions in a RDD context.
Condition I is close to the the conditional independence assumption, and condition II is close to the local
randomization assumption.
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Whether somebody is affected by a change in attitudes towards foreigners depends on the
extent to which he or she identifies with this social group, i.e., the value of ci. Residents
with a foreign passport might identify strongest with the social group of foreigners due
to their ancestry, ethnicity or prior experiences. As an individual to some extent chooses
his or her identity, in our test we explicitly allow that an individual’s self-ascribed social
category might also react to the new information. This idea is grounded in the rejection-
identification model in social psychology (Tajfel, 1978; Branscombe et al., 1999). This
theory asserts that when a minority group member perceives prejudice against his or
her group, that member will develop a stronger identification with the group in order
to reduce the psychological cost of perceived prejudice. The model further states that
this mechanism might not be limited to clearly-defined group identities. Group identities
may develop as a result of perceived prejudice, i.e., minority groups tend to identify with
other minority groups under threat. It is well possible that various groups of foreign
residents react to votes on topics that do not relate directly to them, but to other groups
such as religious minorities, because the issues concern minorities, where being an ’out-
sider’ becomes salient. International students, for example, tend to identify themselves
as an independent group in response to perceived prejudice (Schmitt et al., 2003). And
individuals who observe someone being ostracized, whose perspective they are told to
adopt, identify with the victim and experience personal distress akin to being the target
of the observed ostracism (Wesselmann et al., 2009). Moreover, in recent experimental
and survey studies, Mechtel et al. (2014) provide laboratory evidence that social identity
affects individuals’ decisions and Rudert et al. (2014) conduct a survey which reports the
responses of foreigners in Switzerland after a popular vote on migration in 2014 in order
to investigate whether individuals feel ostracized. The latter study finds that foreigners’
perceptions of their environment reflect the vote’s outcome and that immigrants’ need for
belonging is less satisfied where citizens voted more restrictively.
Building on these considerations from economics and social psychology, we hypothesize
that a negative change in perceived attitudes widens the pool of people who identify
themselves as foreigners, and also causes them psychological distress. In our context, the
minaret initiative, we would expect not only Muslims but also other groups of foreign
residents to experience ostracism, as their identity as foreigners in Switzerland becomes
salient. Specifically, we would also expect EU citizens to be negatively affected by the
initiative, if the identity as a foreigner is the moderating factor.
3.3 Identification of identity utility based on location decisions
The choice set of municipalities remains the same before and after the signal about res-
idents preferences is revealed. Moreover, we assume that the other municipality charac-
teristics do not systematically change around the voting date. We will later on validate
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this assumption. Accordingly, it should be possible to identify the effect of the signal
on the location choice by comparing the location decisions of foreigners who choose their
residency before and after the vote has taken place. As we do not find evidence that
the decision to move is influenced by the vote (see Section 6.5), it can be assumed that
individuals who make their location choice before and after the new information has been
revealed are, on average, the same. Individuals decide to move at some point in time.
Whether they find a new home on a specific day can be considered as random with respect
to a specific voting date. Consequently, it is more or less random whether an individual
looking for a new apartment is successful in his or her search the day before or after the
vote has taken place. While an individual who finds a new apartment the day before
the vote cannot incorporate the information on the outcome that will be revealed the
next day in his or her choice, an individual who finds an apartment the day after can
utilize the information on the outcome. Hence, individuals who decide to move and look-
ing for an apartment narrowly before the voting day can be used as a control group for
those who make this decision shortly after the vote has taken place (Thistlethwaite and
Campbell, 1960). If revealed preferences of the voting population about their attitudes
towards foreigners play no role for the relative attractiveness of municipalities, foreigners’
location decisions should, on average, be the same before and after the vote. However, if
the mover is affected by perceived attitudes towards his or her group, we should observe
a clear change in the mover’s location decision.
In order to apply this theoretical identification strategy, we would like to compare the
location choices of people who decided to move before the new information became public
with those who decided afterwards. In particular, we would like to exploit the presence of
switcher municipalities (described in Section 2), where we assume that new information
was unexpectedly revealed. We thus aim to compare the probability that a foreigner
chooses to move to one of the identified switcher municipalities before receiving the new
information and after receiving it. If it were possible to determine a priori on which date
the effect on location choices materializes, the test could be approached using a regression
discontinuity design right away, i.e., the local randomization around the specific date could
be used. However, it is not evident when this date might be. Shortly after the vote on
the minaret initiative, many observed movers must have made their location choice before
the vote took place and who were therefore unable to incorporate the new information.
The longer the time is that elapses after the polling day, the larger will be the number of
movers who have made their location choice based on the updated information set. The
two groups might therefore overlap for some time until only movers who could incorporate
the new information are observed. The corresponding time lag relative to the polling day
might be affected by the length of notice periods and the situation in the housing market.
In the next subsection, we provide a framework to analyze how the new information is
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incorporated into individuals’ observed location choices. In Section 4, we translate the
insights into our empirical strategy.
3.4 Incorporation of new information in observed location choices
The location choice equilibrium for foreigners materializes in a stable aggregate probability
of choosing a particular municipality type. This holds over time and refers in our context
to the switcher and non-switcher municipalities. For the individual location decision,
we, however, only observe the moving date, but not the decision date. Accordingly,
"observed" individual location choices might be based on different information sets. There
is a timespan after the vote, during which we observe a mixture of those people who
made their location choice before the information became public and those who decided
subsequently. The effect of the change in perceived attitudes, given there is an effect,
materializes to the extent that the search generation that could incorporate the new
information outweighs the prior search generations. This transition between the search
cohorts could be smooth or sharp. To gain an idea of how the effect could materialize,
we perform a simulation analysis of individual location choices.
Appendix A presents the details of the analysis. We simulate a simple location search with
overlapping search generations. Two institutional scenarios are considered, and a negative
treatment effect on the probability of moving to a switcher municipality is assumed. First,
only search frictions exist, and people move once they have found an apartment. Second,
a notice period is taken into account. It is clearly revealed that in the second setting,
the new information is incorporated later on in the aggregate outcome than in the first
setting, i.e., in the inflow of foreigners to the switcher municipalities. Moreover, the
adjustment pattern also reveals a much steeper drop in the probability of moving to a
switcher municipality in the scenario with a notice period than in the scenario without
one. With search frictions alone, in most cases, a rather gradual adjustment to the new
equilibrium occurs.
Based on the assumption that it is random when an individual chooses to move and finds
an apartment, a regression discontinuity framework is suitable to analyze the incorpora-
tion of the new information. We apply the method of a regression discontinuity design
with unknown discontinuity points (as introduced in the following Section 4) to measure
the drop. The simulation clearly indicates that in an environment with legal restrictions
that delay moving - such as a notice period - the method can find a discontinuity. This
is not always the case in the scenario with search frictions alone. Given the rental agree-
ments in Switzerland that stipulate mandatory as well as discretionary notice periods,
the effect of a change in attitudes towards foreigners should be identifiable in observed
moving dates.
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4 Empirical strategy
Based on the theoretical considerations, we derived predictions on how individual location
choices in response to new information translate into changes in aggregate migration flows
between municipalities. In an environment with institutional restrictions, any displace-
ment effect, given one exists, is expected to materialize as a jump (or discontinuity) in the
probability that a foreigner will choose to locate in a switcher municipality some time af-
ter the vote has taken place. The regression discontinuity design (RDD) is an appropriate
method to measure treatment effects at such points. However, in most RDD applications
the discontinuity point is known, since it is, for instance, determined by the institution
being analyzed. In our application though, this is not the case. The discontinuity point is
the result of the interaction between the state of the housing market and institutional con-
ditions such as the notice period. As a consequence, it is not deterministically predictable
a priori when the discontinuity is expected to occur.
Porter and Yu (2015) have recently proposed an approach that is particularly well suited
for the problem at hand. They exploit the fact that testing for the presence of a treatment
effect in such a context is similar to nonparametric testing for a structural change. They
develop a nonparametric procedure to perform regression discontinuity analyses when
discontinuity points are unknown, but predicted by theory. They describe a procedure
that starts with a specification test. This tests the null hypothesis of no treatment effect,
or that of no discontinuity in the relationship between a dependent variable y and a
running variable x. Subsequently, the discontinuity point or threshold is estimated, given
that the specification test rejects the null hypothesis. Finally, a standard RDD analysis
is performed.
4.1 Regression discontinuity designs with unknown discontinuity
points
In classical studies with regression discontinuity designs, the forcing variable, also referred
to as the running variable, is used to determine the treatment status. When the value
of this variable exceeds a certain threshold, observations are treated, but not so below
this value. In the classical case, this threshold is deterministically known and defined by
some policy. If individuals have no perfect control over the value of the forcing variable,
the random variation narrowly around the threshold can be exploited to estimate local
average treatment effects at this particular point (see, e.g., Imbens and Lemieux, 2008,
and Lee and Lemieux, 2010 for reviews of the RDD).
However, the threshold value might not be known ex ante even though theory predicts
that there should be one. Card et al. (2008) are - to our knowledge - the first who try to
estimate an unknown threshold value in order to estimate effects at this point. In their
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application, they are interested in the presence of a minority population in a municipality
and the share after which the majority starts to leave the municipality; i.e., a tipping
point based on the Schelling model about dynamics in segregation (Schelling, 1971).
Here, we follow the approach proposed by Porter and Yu (2015) and apply the RDD with
unknown discontinuity points. In our application, we concentrate on the sharp design.
We further only discuss the case with one discontinuity point, even though their approach
allows for multiple discontinuity points.8
The relationship of interest between the dependent variable y and the running variable x
when estimating a RDD can be expressed by the following reduced-form expression:
y = m(x) +  = mc(x) + τcdc + .
Where m(x) is some function of x, dc is a treatment indicator (d = 1(x > c)), E[|x, dc] =
0 and τc is the potential treatment effect at c. mc(x) = m(x)− τcdc and c ∈ Π = [c, c].
The starting point of the procedure is to test whether there is a discontinuity in the
relationship. Therefore the proposed approach by Porter and Yu (2015) first tests two
hypotheses in order to disentangle whether there is a selection effect, a treatment effect,
both, or neither of the two:
H
(1)
0 : no effects
H
(1)
1 : selection only (3)
H
(2)
0 : no effects & selection only
H
(2)
1 : treatment effect only & both selection and treatment effect (4)
They further propose conducting these tests sequentially and starting with the test of
(4). If H(2)0 cannot be rejected, a test of (3) should be performed. They develop a test
statistic for which the only difference in testing (3) or (4) is the choice of a different
smoothing parameter. When testing (3), m(x) is estimated nonparametrically, thereby
overersmoothing the estimate so that the resulting bias generates power. When testing
(4), however, m(x) is undersmoothed, and the bias in the selection case will disappear
asymptotically, while a jump in m(x) would still generate power. So the bandwidth in
testing (3) is larger than the bandwidth in testing (4). As we are interested exclusively in
cases where there is a treatment effect, we will only test (4). If H(2)0 cannot be rejected,
we abstain from further analysis. According to the approach by Porter and Yu (2015), it
can be assumed that there is a discontinuity in m(x) if H(2)0 is rejected by the specification
test. It can be proceeded with the estimation of the threshold value c. Once c is known,
the size of the discontinuity τc can be estimated. Before discussing these latter aspects,
we describe how the specification test is performed.
8A discussion of the fuzzy case and an in-depth discussion of the theoretical derivations and the method
are presented in the original paper (Porter and Yu, 2015).
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Porter and Yu (2015) derive a consistent specification test for the hypothesis. In order to
find critical values, the empirical distribution of the test statistic under the null hypothesis
is simulated.
Consider the relationship between y and x as
y = m(x) + e. (5)
Under H(1)0 E[e|x] = E[|x] = 0 for x ∈ Π and under H(1)1 E[e|x] 6= 0. By observing that
E[eE[e|x]1Πx ] = E[E[e|x]21Πx ] = E[(m(x) − m(x))21Πx ] ≥ 0 and that the equality only
holds if H(1)0 is true, they construct a consistent test for (3) based on E[eE[e|x]]1Πx . They
state that E[e|x] can be estimated by a kernel estimator, and choose to estimate a density-
weighted version of E[eE[e|x]1Πx ], and hence E[eE[e|x]f(x)1Πx ] in order to overcome the
random denominator problem in kernel estimation. ei is estimated by the nonparametric
residual from (5) (eˆi = yi− yˆi) and E[ei|xi]f(xi) by a kernel estimator to obtain a feasible
test statistic. yˆi is a kernel estimator of m(xi) defined as
yˆi =
1
n− 1
X
j 6=i
yjLb,ij/fˆi
and fˆi is estimated by
fˆi =
1
n− 1
X
j 6=i
Lb,ij,
where Lb,ij = 1b l(
xi−xj
b
) is a second-order kernel9 and b is the bandwidth. Note that (xi, yi)
is excluded in estimating m(xi). E[ei|xi]fi is estimated by 1n−1
P
j 6=i eˆjLh,ij1
Π
j . Finally,
the test statistic is based on
In =
nh1/2
n(n− 1)
X
i
X
j 6=i
1Πi 1
Π
j Lh,ij eˆieˆj.
Under H(1)0 , eˆi is a good estimator for i, but under H
(1)
1 it includes a bias in the neigh-
borhood of c.10 This generates power.
In order to use In in testing (4), it has to be made sure that E[eE[e|x]f(x)1Πx ] is ap-
proximately zero under H(2)0 . Porter and Yu (2015) derive that, when estimating the test
statistic, the bandwidths have to be smaller when testing H(2)0 than those used for H
(1)
0
in order to eliminate the bias in approximating m(x) by m(x).
They provide the asymptotic distribution of In. The asymptotic variance of the test
statistic can be consistently estimated by
v2n =
2h
n(n− 1)
X
i
X
j 6=i
1Πi 1
Π
j L
2
h,ij eˆ
2
i eˆ
2
j
9Please note that we use a uniform or rectangular kernel for the specification testing and the estimation
of cˆ in our application. We do not want to give too much weight to single days because of the possible
periodical patterns in individuals’ moving behavior.
10Whereby for these estimates the following is recommended: Take h < b; b ∼ n−c; h ∼ n−(2c+δ) where
δ is an arbitrarily small positive number and 14 ≤ c < 12 .
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for the testing of both hypotheses. The resulting studentized test statistic is Tn = In/vn.
As the convergence rate of Tn to a standard normal is very slow, they propose approxi-
mating the finite-sample distribution by using the wild bootstrap of Wu (1986) and Liu
(1988). The bootstrap samples are generated by imposing the null hypothesis; i.e., such
that they will mimic the null distribution of Tn. The algorithm is specified as follows:
Step 1: Generate the two-point wild bootstrap residual for i = 1, ..., n. ∗i = eˆi(1 −
√
5)/2
with probability (1 +
√
5)/(2
√
5), and ∗i = (1 +
√
5)/2 with probability (
√
5 −
1)/(2
√
5). Then E∗[∗i ] = 0 and E∗[∗i ] = eˆ∗i .11
Step 2: Generate the bootstrap resample {y∗i , xi}ni=1 by y∗i = yˆi + ∗i . Only data with xi ∈
[c − b, c + b] are needed to construct I∗n. Then calculate the bootstrap residuals
eˆ∗i = y
∗
i − yˆ∗i .12
Step 3: Use the resulting samples to calculate the test statistic T ∗n = I∗n/v∗n using the same
bandwidths as in the estimation of Tn. Where
I∗n =
nh1/2
n(n− 1)
X
i
X
j 6=i
1Πi 1
Π
j Lh,ij eˆ
∗
i eˆ
∗
j
and
v∗2n =
2h
n(n− 1)
X
i
X
j 6=i
1Πi 1
Π
j L
2
h,ij eˆ
∗2
i eˆ
∗2
j .
Step 4: Repeat the three former steps B13 times and use the resulting empirical distribution
to approximate the null distribution of Tn. H0 can consequently be rejected if
Tn > T
∗
n(αB). T
∗
n(αB) is the upper α-percentile of the empirical distribution of T
∗
n .
As discussed before, this test can equally be used to test H(2)0 . If H
(2)
0 , which implies that
there is no discontinuity in the relationship, can be rejected by the specification test, the
threshold value c and the discontinuity size τc can be estimated. Porter and Yu (2015)
determine the discontinuity point by
cˆ = arg max
c∈Π
τˆ 2(c),
and thus by checking whether c = xi (xi ∈ Π) maximizes τˆ 2(c).
The estimate of τˆ(c), i.e., the nonparametric estimate of the discontinuity in the relation-
ship between y and x at c, is thereby estimated as in the classical RDD literature. In
11Note that ∗i is, in effect, simulated based on the centered eˆi, eˆi = eˆi− eˆ. For more details, see Porter
and Yu (2015).
12yˆ∗i is defined as yˆi, except that yi in (5) is replaced by y∗j .
13In our application, B is set to 1, 500.
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the sharp design, this amounts to the estimation of the difference in the limits of m when
approaching the threshold from the left and from the right.
τˆ(c) = mˆ+(c)− mˆ−(c).
This is normally done using a local polynomial estimator as, for example, described in
Porter (2003), Hahn et al. (2001), and Imbens and Lemieux (2008). Importantly, Porter
and Yu (2015) show that τˆc is a natural by-product of the estimation of the discontinuity
point, and that c can be treated as if known when estimating treatment effects in RDDs.
The asymptotic distribution of τˆ(cˆ) is the same as if c were known. After the estimation
of c, one can perform a standard RDD analysis.
4.2 Estimation in the regression discontinuity design
We briefly describe how we estimate the local average treatment effect in our RDD14
setting with time as the assignment variable, given that the null hypothesis of no treatment
effect could be rejected.15
A peculiarity of this approach is that it is necessary to control for periodical patterns
before running the analysis. We control for theses patterns, which are very probable in
moving patterns, using a battery of indicator variables. As often done in RDD studies,
we first run a linear regression of the dependent variable on covariates. Subsequently,
the residual of this regression is used as the dependent variable in our analysis (see,
e.g., Lee and Lemieux, 2010).16 For notational convenience, we will nonetheless refer to
our dependent variable as yit or the probability that an individual moves to a switcher
municipality.
Given that the necessary assumptions for a sharp RDD hold and that the estimated
threshold value cˆ is estimated based on the approach proposed by Porter and Yu (2015),
the treatment effect τ can be estimated by the following limits17
14A practical guide for the estimation of a RDD is provided by Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
15There are few studies that use time as the assignment variable so far. Davis (2008) is, to our
knowledge, the first. He uses the introduction date of a program aimed at reducing pollution in Mexico
City as the threshold. Another example is the study by Paola et al. (2012). They use a RDD approach
over time to investigate the effect of the introduction of a system with penalty points for driving offenses
in Italy. They identify the causal effect of the new system on road safety.
16We first run the specification
yt = β0 + β1xt + ut,
where yt is our dependent variable and thus an indicator of whether an individual moved to a switcher
municipality. The variable xt includes indicator variables for the month, the day of the month, and the
weekday of the movement. We perform this procedure separately for each canton and use data between
2006 and 2008 for the estimation. We then predict the residual ut for the whole time span and use it as
our dependent variable.
17The identification of a treatment effect in a RDD setting is only possible at x = c, i.e., a LATE is
identified at x = c (Hahn et al., 2001).
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ÛE(τi|xi = c) = Ûlim
x→c+
E(yi|xi = x)− Ûlim
x→c−
E(yi|xi = x). (6)
Where y stands for the dependent variable, x represents the assignment variable (in our
application the moving date), limx→c+ stands for the limit approaching the threshold from
the right, and limx→c− , the limit coming from the left.
For the point estimates in our analysis, we follow Hahn et al. (2001) and Porter (2003)
and estimate the limits in (6) by a LLR using a uniform kernel, as in the specification
testing, and variance estimates as proposed in Porter (2003).18 To obtain, for example,
an estimator for limx→c− E(Yi|xi = x), i.e., to the left of the threshold, a regression with a
constant term with coefficient αY l (l for left) and a linear term in xc with coefficient βY l, to
correct for the influence of xc on the outcome, is specified (yi = αyl +βylxci+ ). Thereby,
xc corresponds to the forcing variable x centered at the threshold c (xc = x − c). This
estimation includes all data points within the range x− h ≤ x < c (or xc − h ≤ xc < 0).
The estimate αˆyl then emerges from the solution to the following minimization problem
min
αyl;βyl
NX
i=1
(yi − αyl − βylxci)2Kh (xci − 0) I(xci < 0)
(Hahn et al., 2001). The analogous procedure is applied for the estimation of the other
limit in equation (6). h represents the suitable bandwidth h > 0 and Kh (xi − c), the
kernel weighting function, defined as Kh (xi − c) = 1hK

xi−c
h
Ł
. Since x is centered at c,
the estimate of the constant corresponds to the value of the regression function at the
threshold. The treatment effect estimator in the sharp RDD is given by τˆ = τˆc = αˆY r−αˆY l.
The asymptotic distribution of the treatment effect estimator can be expressed as
√
Nh (τˆY − τY ) d−→ N (0, VτY ) as Nh→∞.
The specification for the estimation on both sides of the determined threshold can be
formulated as
yi = α + β(moving_date− cˆ) + .
For graphical representation, we plot a local linear regression of y over x using a rectan-
gular kernel to gain an impression of the basic relationship. This is done either separately
from both sides of the threshold or over the whole range of x, depending on the analysis
at hand.
18Since the LLR framework is well understood, our analysis, like many others, abstains from applying
a more complicated model (such as the GAM) and uses a linear probability model, which directly models
P (Y = 1) = X ′β. This model can be directly estimated using LS, or LLR in the present case. The
drawbacks of this approach are clear. Using this linear model, it is possible to obtain predicted proba-
bilities below zero or above one, which is at odds with the definition of a probability. However, in many
applications this approach seems to be a useful simplification (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p.
466ff.).
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4.3 Assumptions of the regression discontinuity design
The crucial assumptions for the validity of a sharp RDD are the local randomization and
the continuity of conditional expectations, which provides that, without the treatment,
both groups are alike at the threshold. The latter assumption makes sure that in a
world without the treatment or in a world where everyone is treated, there would be no
discontinuity in the conditional expectations at the threshold, i.e., that the effect found can
be attributed to the received treatment. Local randomization describes the situation that
it is more or less random whether an individual decides to move before or after the vote,
i.e., that individuals are not able to perfectly manipulate their value of the assignment
variable (Lee and Lemieux, 2010; Hahn et al., 2001). Note that these assumptions in
some respect also evolve from our theoretical reasoning in Section 3. In our setting, they
translate to the assumptions that individuals deciding to move before or after the vote
are on average the same and that the characteristics of switcher municipalities, except
for their voting behavior, have not changed systematically. Further, the basic assumption
also implies that the moving probability of individuals does not change at the threshold.
Otherwise, this would correspond to a manipulation of the running variable. We present
a series of validation checks for the specific assumptions after the results in Section 6.
5 Data
We primarily use comprehensive register data on the whole foreign population in Switzer-
land for the years between 2006 and 2011, which was kindly provided by the Swiss Federal
Statistical Office (BFS) in cooperation with the Federal Office for Migration (BFM). We
thus rely on high quality data when it comes to moving dates. We restrict our estimation
sample to be the universe of all foreigners in Switzerland holding either the residence
permit B, for temporary residency, or C, for permanent residency. We thus exclude for-
eigners with other types of permits such as refugees, who are not allowed to choose their
location freely. We exclusively use data on individuals moving within Switzerland, and
thus exclude those just immigrating or leaving the country. In total, this sample includes
roughly 7,854,025 observations and 559,951 incidences of foreigners moving.
Further, we use data on municipality characteristics and voting outcomes. This data
is freely available on the website of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Data on the
municipality tax rates has been kindly provided by Parchet (2014).
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6 Results
The results of our empirical analysis are presented in four steps. First, we perform the
analysis for one canton, i.e., the canton of Thurgau, to show how we apply the empirical
strategy. In a second step, we pool the observations of those cantons for which a disconti-
nuity is detected. Third, we test and reject an alternative supply-side explanation of the
general phenomenon; i.e. landlords’ discriminatory behavior. In a fourth step, we report
the results of the validation of the identifying assumptions.
The empirical analysis uses data for 22 Swiss cantons. Separate analyses are performed for
each canton, as the threshold date might vary depending on the situation on the housing
market and institutional variation.19 We abstain from testing for a treatment effect in
four cantons, namely the cantons of Uri, Obwalden, Appenzell-Innerrhoden and Geneva.
The former three cantons are rather small and, although we draw on register data, there
are too few observations to perform the analysis. Furthermore, we exclude the canton
of Geneva, since no municipality in this canton accepted the minaret initiative, and thus
there is no switcher municipality.
6.1 Exemplary analysis for a single canton
In order to provide an intuition for the application of the methodology used, we first
exemplify our econometric proceeding for the canton of Thurgau (TG). The dependent
variable of interest is an indicator of whether a moving individual chooses to locate in a
switcher municipality.20
We first visually inspect how the probability that a foreigner chooses to move to one
of the switcher municipalities evolves over time, whereby we undersmooth the estimate
using the same bandwidth as in the specification testing. As can be seen in Figure 3,
the probability is rather stable until the vote, which is marked by the solid vertical line.
Some time after the vote has taken place, the probability seems to drop temporarily. For
the detection of a possible threshold, we define a time span within which we expect the
jump to occur, if there is one. This time span is marked by the two dashed vertical lines.
We perform the specification test as described in Section 4; i.e., testing the null hypothesis
of no treatment effect, within the defined time span. We find that the null hypothesis
is rejected for this canton. The test statistic is 2.62 and exceeds the critical value of
19Thus, we test for a discontinuity in the following cantons: Zürich (ZH), Bern (BE), Luzern (LU),
Schwyz (SZ), Nidwalden (NW), Glarus (GL), Zug (ZG), Fribourg (FR), Solothurn (SO), Basel-Stadt (BS),
Basel-Landschaft (BL), Schaffhausen (SH), Appenzell-Ausserrhoden (AR), St. Gallen (SG), Graubünden
(GR), Aargau (AG), Thurgau (TG), Ticino (TI), Vaud (VD), Valais (VS), Neuchâtel (NE), and Jura
(JU).
20As addressed before, we use the residual of a regression on time indicators to control for periodical
patterns, thus in "normal" times it varies around zero.
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Figure 3: Probability of moving to a switcher municipality in the canton of Thurgau. Local
linear smooth of the probability that a foreigner moves to a switcher municipality, using a
bandwidth of 30 days.
0.79 at the 5% significance level. These results are also listed in Table B.3 in Appendix
B. The estimated threshold date for the canton of Thurgau is March 2, 2010 and, thus
about 3 months after the vote has taken place. We proceed with a classical RDD analysis
and plot a local linear smooth separately from both sides of the estimated threshold.
In Figure 4, a negative jump in the probability that a foreigner chooses to locate in a
switcher municipality is observed at the estimated threshold date. Moreover, it seems
that the effect fades and that after some time the probability that a foreigner moves to a
switcher municipality returns to its former level.
When we estimate the treatment effect at the detected threshold, we find a statistically
significant negative discontinuity at the particular date. The probability of moving to
a switcher municipality drops by 16 percentage points at the threshold. The details of
the estimation result are listed Table B.4 in Appendix B. This is first evidence demon-
strating that foreigners are deterred from locating to switcher municipalities where voters
unexpectedly expressed stronger reservations towards foreigners.
6.2 Pooled analysis
Overall effect
We pool the data of 12 cantons for which we detect a discontinuity.21 They account for
60% of all moving individuals in our data. The corresponding results of the specification
21These cantons are: ZH, BE, SZ, NW, GL, SO, AR, GR, TG, TI, VD, and VS.
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Figure 4: Probability of moving to a switcher municipality in the canton of Thurgau - RDD
graph around the threshold date March 2, 2010. Local linear smooth of the probability that a
foreigner moves to a switcher municipality separately from both sides of the threshold, and using
a bandwidth of 60 days.
test are presented in Table B.3 in Appendix B.22 The null hypothesis of no effect is not
rejected for the remaining ten cantons. This does not necessarily exclude the possibility
that foreigners in these cantons also reacted. However, the situation on the housing
market or the incorporation of the new information might not have followed a pattern
which would have allowed the applied method to capture the effect. For our analysis of
the pooled observations, we center the moving dates at the detected thresholds, such that
the resulting threshold for the pooled results is zero. The threshold dates are estimated
to lie between about 1 month and 5.5 months after the vote. Combining data for all
moving foreigners in cantons with a discontinuity and repeating the RDD plot of LLR
smooths from both sides of the threshold, we obtain the pattern presented in Figure 5.
A pronounced negative jump at the threshold is observed. Moreover, the probability of
moving to a switcher municipality seems to return to its former level after some time.
22Regarding the necessary bandwidth choice in the applied nonparametric procedure, we abstain from
using a technique that either depends on the variance of the assignment variable or cross-validation.
First, our running variable is a date and the variation of such a variable makes no sense. Cross-validation
would be theoretically appealing. However, it is far too computationally intensive, given the large number
of observations and the simulation-based approach. We rather rely on eye-balling and group cantons
according to size when choosing the bandwidth that is as small as possible but which makes the graphs
reasonably smooth. We start with a bandwidth size of 45 days for the largest cantons ZH, BE, AG,
and VD. This bandwidth size ensures that each estimation includes one beginning and one end of the
month, when relocations are frequent. The next group contains the cantons LU, FR, SO, BL, SG, TG,
TI, and VS for which a bandwidth of 60 days is applied. We use 75 days for the cantons SZ, ZG, BS,
SH,GR, and NE. For the smallest ones, i.e., NW, GL, AR, and JU, a bandwidth of 90 days is chosen.
These bandwidths are used for the RDD graphs, the RDD estimates and the threshold search. As the
bandwidth for the testing has to be considerably smaller than for these estimates, we choose to use half
of it in the testing procedure.
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Figure 5: Probability of moving to municipalities revealing stronger reservations against foreign-
ers - RDD graph for pooled data. Local linear smooth of the probability that a foreigner moves
to a switcher municipality separately from both sides of the threshold, and using a bandwidth
of 45 days.
Estimating the treatment effect at the threshold as described in Section 4, the estimated
drop in the probability that a foreigner moves to a switcher municipality is about 4 to 8
percentage points, depending on the applied bandwidth. The corresponding estimation
results are presented in Table 1. They are rather robust to the bandwidth choice. The
estimated effect is sizable. Before the threshold dates, the average probability that for-
eigners move to a switcher municipality was about 13 percent. The jump at the threshold
of about 4 to 8 percentage points, thus amounts to a drop by about 30 to 60 percent.
Table 1: Probability that foreigners move to municipalities revealing stronger reservations
towards foreigners - RDD estimates using pooled data
Dependent variable: Moving to a switcher municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
τ -0.0824*** -0.0819*** -0.0601*** -0.0389*** -0.0358*** -0.0385***
(0.0112) (0.00997) (0.00804) (0.00698) (0.00628) (0.00566)
P (switch)before 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
h 45 60 90 120 150 180
N left 5,971 7,415 11,636 16,904 21,278 25,968
N right 5,876 8,156 12,729 17,020 21,232 26,000
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates for different bandwidths and orders of polynomials. Standard
errors in parentheses. P (switch)before refers to the average probability of moving to a switcher munici-
pality within a range of 60 days before the threshold date for the respective sample. Significance levels:
* .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Temporal development of the effect
As is evident from the graph in Figure 5, the effect fades after some time. To gain an
impression of how long the effect persists, we run a linear regression model including
indicators for time periods after the break on the pooled data for a time span of half a
year around the threshold dates. We estimate a model of the form
yi = β0 +
6X
k=1
γk1(xc,i ≥ (k − 1) · 30 & xc,i < k · 30) + i,
where y is our dependent variable, i.e., the residual of a regression of time fixed effects
on an indicator set to one if an individual moves to a switcher municipality, xc is the
moving date centered at the estimated threshold for the corresponding canton, and k · 30
stands for a number series rising in intervals of 30 days: {0, 30,...,180}. The γ coefficients
consequently indicate whether the probability of moving to a switcher municipality is
different from the level before the break within the specified time span. The estimation
results are presented in Table 2. It turns out that the effect becomes weaker over time,
as suggested by the graphical evidence. There is no systematic difference in the level
anymore about 150 days, or 5 months, after the break. This leveling off could have
occurred, because the issue is no longer salient, i.e., expressed attitudes are no longer
being discussed in the media. Alternatively, or in some combination, the housing market
could have adjusted to a new equilibrium in which foreigners are compensated by, for
example, lower rents for their disutility of residing in a municipality in which attitudes
towards them are more negative.
Table 2: Temporal development of the probability that foreigners move to switcher municipal-
ities - estimates using pooled data
Dependent variable: Moving to a switcher municipality
Coef. β0 γ30 γ60 γ90 γ120 γ150 γ180
0.010*** –0.049*** –0.015*** –0.012** –0.025*** –0.011** –0.005
(0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
No. of obs. 51,817
R2 0.0019
F 16.18
Notes: β0 captures the constant term. γ. are coefficients for deviations from the level before the break for
intervals of 30 days. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05,
*** p < .01.
Effects for different groups of foreigners
The vote on the minaret initiative prohibited Muslim communities from constructing
further minarets. The change in the substantive law was thus narrow and affected solely
one particular group within the foreign population of Switzerland. However, the public
discourse was much broader in that it addressed general concerns about migration, as
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well as the role of (religious) tolerance and cultural identity in Switzerland. Based on
the content of the initiative, we would expect that foreigners, in particular those with
a Muslim background, experience lower identity utility if they move to a municipality
where the initiative had unexpectedly received wide support. However, due to the general
discourse, the outcome of the vote might well have been perceived as a revelation of
attitudes towards foreigners in general. According to our understanding of the event,
we share such an interpretation. Moreover, identity theories predict that other (foreign)
minority groups identify with the beleaguered minority group. Accordingly, similar effects
for different groups of foreigners are expected.
In order to learn about any heterogeneity across groups of foreigners, we re-estimate the
effect for various subsamples of foreigners. As the results in Table 3 show, we find similar
effects for foreigners holding either temporary or a permanent residence permit, for Euro-
pean and non-European foreigners, as well as for foreigners from Muslim countries.23 This
is evidence that the change in perceived attitudes affected the attractiveness of particular
municipalities for the group of foreigners across nationalities and cultural backgrounds.
Table 3: Reactions in moving behavior for different groups of foreigners - RDD estimates using
pooled data for subsamples
Dependent variable: Moving to a switcher municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Baseline Temp. residency Perm. residency Non-European European Muslim
τ -0.0819*** -0.0841*** -0.0761*** -0.0934*** -0.0795*** -0.0577***
(0.00997) (0.0122) (0.0168) (0.0231) (0.0110) (0.0216)
P (switch)before 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.1
h 60 60 60 60 60 90
N left 7,415 4,441 2,974 1,072 6,340 1,199
N right 8,156 4,930 3,226 1,170 6,984 1,363
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates for different subsamples. Standard errors in parentheses.
P (switch)before refers to the average probability of moving to a switcher municipality within a range
of 60 days before the threshold date for the respective sample. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, **
.01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Effects for foreigners with different occupational skill levels
So far, the evidence suggests that, in general, residents of Switzerland with a foreign
nationality expected to experience a loss in identity utility if they were to move to a
municipality that unexpectedly revealed increased reservations towards foreigners. Inde-
pendent of nationality and cultural background, effects might, however, differ depending
on individual skill levels. Two arguments are of particular interest with regard to for-
23We have no information about an individuals’ religious affiliation. Instead, we infer that individuals
originating from countries where Islam is the main religion are more likely to be Muslim. The classification
on the main religion of countries is based on the Cross-National Socio-Economic and Religion Data, 2011
and was downloaded from the Association of Religion Data Archives, www.TheARDA.com.
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eigners with low- and high-skill levels, respectively. Regarding the first group, studies
investigating the determinants of attitudes towards foreigners frequently argue that con-
cerns about the welfare system play an important role (see, e.g., Hainmueller and Hiscox,
2010; Dustmann and Preston, 2007). Thus, immigrants with a low level of education,
who are more likely to rely on the welfare system, might be the main drivers as well as
the main targets of negative attitudes towards foreigners. It is, however, open whether
they also suffer the highest loss in identity utility when residing in an environment with
strong reservations against foreigners. Instead, foreigners with a high education might be
particularly sensitive towards such reservations. They might also be more interested in
politics and more likely to follow the discussion in the media than their less well educated
compatriots.
In our data, we have only limited information about the formal education of the individ-
uals in our sample to test for differential effects across skill levels. Instead, we rely on
information about individuals’ occupations. As the immigration authorities do not collect
this information systematically, it is only available for about 15% of individuals in our
data. We infer people’s (occupational) skill level by matching occupations to standards of
required formal education. It is important to note that immigrants work in occupations
that do not match their skill level more often than nationals. Their formal educational
degrees might not be accepted, this might be especially the case for, e.g., refugees from
non-western countries. Miscategorizations are therefore likely, in particular for people
in occupations with formally low skill requirements. To mitigate this miscategorization
problem as much as possible we use only individuals originating from countries from which
formal education is most likely accepted in Switzerland. These are the countries of the
European-Union, countries on the American continent, as the United States, Canada,
and Brasil. We further include Australia, and New Zealand. Concentrating on these
individuals, we expect that occupation is a good approximation of the skill level.
We use the ISCO-08 classification of the International Labour Office (2012) to classify
the skill level needed to perform specific occupations. The four point classification con-
siders not only required formal education, but also the task complexity of the respective
occupation. We differentiate between high, upper-medium, medium and low skilled indi-
viduals.24
The number of observations for the estimates in this particular sample get scarce. Nonethe-
less we can interpret them qualitatively. We find that the high-skilled group is most sensi-
tive to the revelation of new information about citizens’ attitudes towards foreigners. The
24We code somebody as high-skilled if his or her occupation corresponds to an ISCO skill level of
4, i.e., the second stage of tertiary education or first stage of tertiary education (medium duration).
Upper-medium skilled, i.e., ISCO skill level of 3 and thus the first stage of tertiary education (short or
medium duration). Medium skilled people refer to an ISCO skill level of 2, i.e., lower to post-secondary
education. Foreigners considered low-skilled are in an occupation of ISCO skill level 1 which requires
primary education only.
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Table 4: Reactions in moving behavior for foreigners with different occupational skill levels -
RDD estimates using pooled data
Dependent variable: Moving to a switcher municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Sample High High High Up-med. Up-med. Up-med. Med. Med. Med. Low Low Low
skill skill skill skill skill skill skill skill skill skill skill skill
τ -0.203** -0.151** -0.155*** -0.104 -0.0643 -0.0324 -0.109 -0.00349 0.0353 0.0600 0.00904 0.0233
(0.0803) (0.0658) (0.0595) (0.0716) (0.0940) (0.0955) (0.0931) (0.0789) (0.0662) (0.116) (0.0968) (0.0744)
P (switch)before 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08
h 60 90 120 60 90 120 60 90 120 60 90 120
N left 77 112 156 33 55 69 70 124 181 50 83 125
N right 65 108 140 31 45 62 82 124 164 51 85 120
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates for different subsamples. Standard errors in parentheses.
P (switch)before refers to the average probability of moving to a switcher municipality within a range
of 60 days before the threshold date for the respective sample. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, **
.01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
estimate is significantly different from zero despite the few observations. For the other
groups, the discontinuity estimates seem to fall the lower the skill level is. However, the
estimates for these other groups are not significantly different from zero at conventional
levels. Whatever the cause, the results suggest that the group of immigrants that triggers
most of the resentments is not the group that suffers the most from them. It is, instead,
rather the high-skilled immigrants who seem to react the most.
6.3 Validation check for the relevance of the change in the relative
political positioning of the switcher municipalities
The definition of the switcher municipalities results in a dichotomous categorization of
municipalities. Accordingly, we see per construction an equivalent positive jump in the
probability of moving to a non-switcher municipality at the threshold. The corresponding
pattern is presented in Figure 6a. RDD estimation results are reported in Table 5 in
column 1, 2, and 3. Moreover the classification itself rests on a central argument em-
phasizing that the voters in a switcher municipality not only expressed a more restrictive
position towards migration than in the past, but that the swing in expressed reservations
is also more pronounced than for the average municipality of a canton (second condi-
tion of the definition for switcher municipalities outlined in Subsection 2.2). In order
to validate the importance of this rank condition, we re-estimate the basic specifications
with the pooled data for an alternative classification of municipalities. We construct
the dependent variable such that it captures the probability of moving to a municipality
that has not changed its rank, i.e., its position regarding its support of critical attitudes
towards foreigners compared to the other municipalities in the canton. Specifically, we
focus on municipalities that are not switcher municipalities and have not experienced a
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(b) Probability of moving to a municipality
with no rank change
Figure 6: Probability of moving to alternative groups of municipalities. Local linear smooth of
the probability that a foreigner moves to a specific group of municipalities separately from both
sides of the threshold, and using a bandwidth of 45 days.
rank change. If our findings are driven by a change in the positioning, we would not
expect to see a pronounced jump, either positive or negative, in the probability of moving
to these municipalities at the estimated thresholds. The resulting pattern is presented
graphically in Figure 6b. The results for the RDD treatment effect estimates are reported
in Table 5 in columns 4, 5, and 6. We do not find a systematic reaction for this category
of municipalities.
In an additional test, we analyze whether the positive jump within the group of non-
switcher municipalities is consistent with our reasoning. We define two further alternative
classes of municipalities, one including non-switcher municipalities with a positive rank
change, and thus a relative right shift, after the vote on the minaret initiative and one
including non-switcher municipalities with a negative rank change, and thus a relative left
shift. Re-estimating the jump in the probability to move to one of these municipality types
at the threshold, we find that the positive jump in the non-switcher municipalities seems
to be purely driven by municipalities which reduced the rank. The estimation results can
be found in Table 5, columns 7 to 12. This finding is consistent with our reasoning that
foreigners are deterred from moving to municipalities revealing reservations, and rather
choose to move to municipalities that got relatively more attractive in this dimension.
We interpret this as further support that the observed negative jump in the probability
of choosing a switcher municipality is driven by a mover’s perception of an unexpected
negative shift in the social attitudes of these municipalities towards foreigners.
6.4 Test of an alternative supply side explanation
So far, the empirical regularity is interpreted within the theoretical framework based on
demand-side reactions to perceived negative attitudes. However, the observed patterns in
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Table 5: Change in the probability that foreigners move to different samples of non-switcher
municipalities - RDD estimates using pooled data
Dependent variable: Moving to a particular type of non-switcher municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. all all all ∆rank = 0 ∆rank = 0 ∆rank = 0
τ 0.0824*** 0.0819*** 0.0601*** 0.00431 -4.22e-05 -0.00159
(0.0112) (0.00997) (0.00804) (0.00504) (0.00443) (0.00354)
P (minor)before 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.02 0.02 0.02
h 45 60 90 45 60 90
N left 5,971 7,415 11,636 5,971 7,415 11,636
N right 5,876 8,156 12,729 5,876 8,156 12729
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dep. Var. ∆rank > 0 ∆rank > 0 ∆rank > 0 ∆rank < 0 ∆rank < 0 ∆rank < 0
τ -0.00190 0.0191* 0.0128 0.0800*** 0.0628*** 0.0488***
(0.0123) (0.0107) (0.00842) (0.0158) (0.0138) (0.0109)
P (minor)before 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.74 0.74 0.74
h 45 60 90 45 60 90
N left 5,971 7,415 11,636 5,971 7,415 11,636
N right 5,876 8,156 12,729 5,876 8,156 12,729
Notes: Local polynomial sharp RDD estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. P (minor)before refers
to the average probability of moving to a municipality of the respective type within a range of 60 days
before the threshold date. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
aggregate moving behavior across municipalities would also be consistent with a supply-
side reaction. Native landlords in switcher municipalities might feel free to discriminate
against foreigners, once they are informed about their co-residents’ attitudes towards
immigrants. We perform a supplementary test to address the alternative supply-side
explanations.
If the effect is supply-driven and native landlords become less willing to rent their prop-
erty to foreigners, they are expected to discriminate against foreigners in general. When
considering second-generation immigrants who hold the same foreign names, the same
potentially foreign appearance, and the same residence permit types as their parents, one
would thus expect landlords to discriminate against this group in the same way that they
discriminate against the first generation immigrants. However, if the phenomenon is,
instead, demand-driven, a smaller reaction, is expected for the second-generation immi-
grants, as they are in general better assimilated. They grew up in the Swiss institutional
environment, for example, being familiar with referendums on migration issues. We there-
fore repeat our estimates for the group of second-generation foreigners, i.e., individuals
who were born in Switzerland but have not been naturalized. Table 6 reports the es-
timates of the treatment effect. Figure 7 presents the evidence graphically. We find a
much smaller reaction for second generation foreigners, whereby no statistically significant
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treatment effect is estimated. We interpret this finding as evidence that the main effect
is primarily demand-driven.
Table 6: Reaction in moving behavior for second-generation immigrants - RDD estimates using
pooled data
Dependent variable: Moving to a switcher municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τ -0.0174 -0.00497 0.00188 0.00144 -0.00911
(0.0359) (0.0280) (0.0240) (0.0214) (0.0195)
P (switch)before 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
h 60 90 120 150 180
N left 882 1,342 1,925 2,387 2,921
N right 927 1,436 1,919 2,377 2,845
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates. P (switch)before refers to the average probability of moving
to a switcher municipality within a range of 60 days before the threshold date for the respective sample.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
6.5 Validation of the identification assumptions
There are some crucial assumptions that need to hold for a valid RDD setting.
First, local randomization, i.e., individuals deciding to move just before and just after
the vote are, on average, the same. There is no formal test for this assumption and
we do not observe the date of the moving decision. However, most RDD studies check
whether individual characteristics are balanced around the threshold to validate it. We
follow this strategy and estimate a sharp RDD, taking some individual characteristics,
which are available in our data, as dependent variables, and using the estimated threshold
date as threshold value. We report the results of this exercise in Table 7. We find only
one significant estimate for Age and a bandwidth of 45 days. As it is not robust to the
bandwidth choice and seems to be rather small we are not alarmed that our results might
be driven by this difference. We do not find systematic differences in the other individual
characteristics around the threshold.
Second, the characteristics of the switcher municipalities have not changed systematically
after the vote in 2009 with two exceptions. Table 8 reports the results of the corresponding
validation estimates. Regarding the two systematic changes: on the one hand, there is a
decrease in the resident population, and on the other hand, there is a slight increase in the
rate of vacant apartments. Both findings are rather complementary evidence in support
of our main hypothesis, as they are consistent with the observed individual reactions
of foreigners. It can be expected that there will be, at least temporarily, more vacant
apartments if a sizable group of the population shuns switcher municipalities.
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Figure 7: Probability of moving to a switcher municipality for second-generation immigrants.
Local linear smooth of the probability that a second-generation immigrant moves to a switcher
municipality separately from both sides of the threshold, and using a bandwidth of 90 days.
Table 7: Individual characteristics of movers around the threshold dates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var. Age Age P(married) P(married) Duration CH Duration CH P(par. CH) P(par. CH)
τ -1.238*** -0.549 -0.0173 -0.0178 0.000222 0.464 0.000141 -3.18e-05
(0.443) (0.382) (0.0190) (0.0165) (0.381) (0.328) (0.00226) (0.00205)
h 45 60 45 60 45 60 45 60
N left 5,971 7,415 5,971 7,415 5,971 7,415 5,971 7,415
N right 5,876 8,156 5,876 8,156 5,876 8,156 5,876 8,156
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates for different dependent variables. Standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Dependent variables: Age of the individual, P(married) an indicator of whether a person is married,
Duration CH the duration of stay in Switzerland, and P(par. CH) an indicator of whether a parent of
an individual is Swiss. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Third, there is no change in the probability of moving due to the event. It is important
that this condition holds, for example, because a large increase in the prevalence of moving
within the group of non-switcher municipalities would be reflected in a relative decline in
the probability of moving to a switcher municipality. In order to investigate how many
foreigners move per day around the threshold, we generate counts of movers within each
canton and moving date. This approach requires that we control for periodical patterns
before running the analysis. There are dates at which it is much more likely to observe
individuals moving due to the municipalities’ mandatory moving dates and contractual
arrangements on tenancy changeover. We again follow, for example, Davis (2008) in
controlling for these periodical patterns by using a battery of indicator variables. We first
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Table 8: Municipality characteristics before and after the vote on the minaret initiative
Dep. Var. Tax rate Pop Pop_welfare Pop_poor Pop_rich V acant N_comp Natur
T ime –0.286*** 32.551*** 0.014 0.000 0.010*** –0.056 –0.056 0.075
(0.058) (7.971) (0.031) (0.000) (0.001) (0.081) (0.144) (0.061)
1(year ≥ 2009) 0.058 18.495*** –0.070 –0.001* –0.003** –0.196 –0.290 –0.237
(0.140) (4.774) (0.079) (0.000) (0.001) (0.116) (0.356) (0.191)
Switcher municipality 0.044 –1424.448*** –0.279** –0.001 0.026*** –0.269 –4.356*** –0.018
(0.083) (326.222) (0.104) (0.000) (0.007) (0.293) (1.425) (0.017)
Switcher ∗ 1(year ≥ 2009) –0.035 –38.086** 0.008 0.000 –0.001 0.499* 0.311 0.035
(0.048) (15.128) (0.078) (0.000) (0.001) (0.243) (0.255) (0.031)
No. of obs. 9,404 9,404 6,810 10,028 10,028 9,403 8,376 9,355
No. of clusters 24 24 25 25 25 24 24 24
R2 0.78 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.37 0.07 0.05 0.00
Notes: OLS estimations for annual data between 2007 and 2010, including cantonal fixed effects. Standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at the cantonal level. Significance levels: * .05<p<.1, ** .01<p<.05, ***
p<.01. Dependent variables: Tax rate is the municipality tax rate, Pop is the municipality’s population,
Pop_welfare is the share of the population that depends on welfare, Pop_poor is the proportion of the
population classified as poor, Pop_rich is the fraction of the population that is classified as rich, V acant
is the number of vacant apartments per 1,000 inhabitants, N_comp measures how many companies
have been incorporated, and Natur measures the naturalization rate of foreigners in the municipality.
Differences in sample sizes occur, because low number of cases in a municipality are not reported in the
official statistics for reasons of privacy.
run a linear regression of the dependent variable on covariates, and, subsequently, the
residuals of this regression are used as the dependent variable in our analysis (see, e.g.,
Lee and Lemieux, 2010).25 For convenience, we still refer to this variable as the number of
moving individuals. We first estimate a sharp RDD on the number of foreigners moving in
general. The corresponding RDD graph is presented in Figure B.8a. The results for two
RDD estimates are reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9. We find no significant change
in the number of movers. Second, we repeat the exercise using counts of individuals
leaving switcher municipalities. The graphical evidence is presented in Figure B.8b, and
the corresponding estimates are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table 9. As before, we do
not find a systematic change in the probability that a foreigner moves from this group of
municipalities. The latter finding could also be interpreted as evidence that the interaction
between foreigners and citizens in switcher municipalities has not radically changed after
the vote. If it had, we would expect to see foreigners leaving these municipalities. Third,
we check whether the aggregate data still allows us to detect the pattern we found in the
individual data. We repeat the estimation using the residual counts of individuals moving
to a switcher municipality. As is evident from Figure B.9 and the estimates in columns
5 and 6 of Table 9, a drop in the probability of moving to a switcher municipality is still
observed. Foreigners shun switcher municipalities after the vote.
25We first run the specification
yt = β0 + β1xt + ut,
where the dependent variable is yt, the number of moving individuals at a certain date, and xt includes
indicator variables for months, the day of the month and weekdays. We estimate over the period between
2006 and 2008, thus before the event, in order to control for moving behavior in normal times. We then
predict the residual ut for the entire time period and use it as our dependent variable.
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Table 9: Number of moving individuals around the threshold dates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Nmove Nmove Nfrom_switch Nfrom_switch Nto_switch Nto_switch
τ -0.0476 -0.609 -0.250 -0.103 -1.348*** -0.989**
(4.393) (4.310) (0.423) (0.380) (0.461) (0.389)
h 60 90 60 90 60 90
N left 501 753 501 753 501 753
N right 492 738 492 738 492 738
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables: Nmove
corresponds to the number of foreigners moving. Nfrom_switch refers to the foreigners leaving switcher
municipalities, andNto_switch refers to foreigners relocating to switcher municipalities. Significance levels:
* .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
Finally, as in many RDD studies, we run a placebo test by repeating the test procedure
for the same time periods in the previous year (-365 days). We cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no treatment effect in either of the cantons. Results for this placebo test
are reported in Table B.5.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper uses the vote on the Swiss minaret initiative in 2009 as a natural experiment
to identify the effect of reservations towards immigrants on their location choice and thus
indirectly on the utility they derive from residing in a particular municipality. Using
the quasi-random variation in the exact date of the decision to move of individuals and
applying an RDD with unknown discontinuity points, we are able to detect the point
in time after which the effect materializes and to estimate the reaction to the treatment
at this point in time. We find discontinuous drops in the probability that a foreigner
moves to a municipality which has unexpectedly been revealed to have reservations about
immigrants in 12 out of 22 cantons. The estimated reaction is sizable. The probability
of an immigrant relocating to a switcher municipality drops, on average, by about 60
percent. This initial effect levels off over a period of 5 months before it vanishes.
The approval of the amendment involved no real, immediate consequences regarding the
Muslims’ ability to practice their religion. However, the symbolic restriction of prohibiting
the construction of new minarets was heavily discussed and interpreted as a signal of
limited openness towards foreigners. Accordingly, we consider an expected loss of identity
utility due to perceived exclusion to act as a mediator in the observed reaction to the
vote outcome. This interpretation is supported by the finding that the reaction is not
confined to Muslims or non-European immigrants. Non-Muslims are also found to react
strongly to the vote outcome. This finding is in line with research on ostracism and the
rejection-identification model in social psychology which asserts that minority groups tend
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to identify with other minority groups when the latter are under threat and that even a
vague feeling of being ostracized can produce psychological distress.
Moreover, we find that second-generation immigrants who are often well assimilated react
much less strongly, if at all, to the revealed attitudes in the minaret vote. This suggests
that the observed moving pattern after the vote is not driven by landlords who learn about
negative attitudes in their surrounding and feel free to discriminate against foreigners. In
contrast, foreigners in high-skill occupations react much more strongly than foreigners
in medium- and low-skill occupations. Well-educated immigrants therefore seem to be
particularly sensitive to reservations towards foreigners. This observation highlights a
tension when countries try to attract highly-skilled professionals from abroad.
Overall, a location choice model that takes identity utility into account is well suited to
predict and reconcile the observed breaks in foreigners’ relocating patterns between mu-
nicipalities after the vote on the minaret initiative. The analysis reveals that the political
attitudes of prospective co-residents are potentially an important determinant of location
choices for some groups in the population. This holds, in particular, for foreigners who
in many regions of the world experience reservations or even outright rejection. Thus,
we do not think that the findings reported in this analysis are confined to immigrants in
Switzerland. Switzerland is rather exceptionally well suited to the investigation of this
phenomenon. Switzerland’s direct democratic institutions allow researchers to observe
attitudes as revealed in popular votes with a high spatial resolution.
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A Simulation of a simple location search with overlap-
ping search generations
How does the inflow of people with particular preferences into a municipality change when
the municipality becomes less attractive for them? An ex ante understanding is necessary
in order to choose appropriate econometric techniques when analyzing data about moving
behavior to test hypotheses about location choices. This also holds in the context of our
analysis concerning the effect of the revelation of negative attitudes towards foreigners on
immigrants’ location choices.
Whereas our theoretical model is about location decisions, our empirical data is restricted
to information about moving dates. It is thus ex ante unclear how the incorporation of
the new information about attitudes towards foreigners is reflected in moving patterns
after the vote on the minaret initiative. As it can be considered random whether an
individual makes his or her location choice immediately before or after the polling day,
a regression discontinuity design could be applied regarding the decision to locate in a
switcher municipality with the polling day as the threshold date. However, actual moves
materialize only after a decision has been made, and we do not know when people made
their location decisions. We therefore have to decide whether we would predict that
an unexpected negative change in a municipality’s attitudes towards foreigners (switcher
municipality) would elicit a sharp drop in the probability of foreigners choosing to move
to that municipalities or whether we, instead, predict that a gradual transition to a new
equilibrium takes place.
To asses how the effect might materialize, we perform a simulation analysis of individual
location choices. We simulate a simple location search with overlapping search generations
to evaluate which incorporation pattern we would expect. We assume as given that only
those individuals who search a location after the vote can incorporate the information
about revealed attitudes into their choice. We generate a population of 3,500 observations
and randomly assign a point in time at which they decide to relocate. We assume that
individuals terminate the contract with their landlord as soon as they have decided to move
and start to search for an alternative apartment. The probability of a searcher finding
an apartment on each successive day after starting their search is set to 0, 015, such that
the average search length is 66, 66 days. In the baseline setting, the probability that the
apartment lies in a switcher municipality is 0.5. The new information enters the system
at time t0 = 350 and reduces the probability of choosing a switcher municipality by τ =
−0.25. We simulate the location search, once with search frictions alone, i.e., individuals
move at the point in time in which they find an apartment, and once considering a notice
period of 3 months (or 90 days) assuming that individuals cannot move before 90 days,
after starting their search even if they find housing before this limit. The two scenarios
mark the extreme cases in terms of the transaction costs related to moving. While these
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Figure A.1: Simulated probability of moving to a switcher municipality. Local linear smooth
of the probability that an individual chooses to move to a switcher municipality over the moving
date using a bandwidth of 60 days.
costs are assumed minimal in the first scenario, they are assumed to be maximal in the
second. Movers cannot afford to rent two apartments at the same time and do not find
follow-up tenants. Based on the two scenarios, we compare how the new information
is incorporated and reflected in the pattern of the probability of moving to a switcher
municipality over time.
Figure A.1a visualizes the resulting pattern without a notice period, estimated by a local
linear smooth (LLS). The straight line indicates the point in time in which the new
information enters the system. The effect seems to be incorporated gradually, and it
takes some time until the probability of choosing a switcher municipality stabilizes at
its new equilibrium. Figure A.1b shows the resulting picture if a notice period is taken
into account. It again takes some time until the new equilibrium is reached. However,
the new information is incorporated with a time lag and the pattern reveals a much
steeper decline in the probability of moving to a switcher municipality. The effect of
the information is seen to cause a sharp drop in the probability of moving to a switcher
municipality, rather than a gentle decline as in the case when the information is gradually
incorporated. As notice periods are very common in Switzerland (and the default option
in rental agreements), we think that the second pattern of information incorporation is
realistic with regard to our application, and in the choice of econometric techniques for
the empirical analysis.
Assuming that it is random when individuals choose to relocate and find an apartment,
a regression discontinuity framework is suitable to analyze the incorporation of the new
information. The probability of moving to a switcher municipality seems to drop sharply
once the new information takes effect on individuals’ relocation behavior. This sharp drop,
if it really exists, can be measured by estimating a jump or a discontinuity. However, the
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Figure A.2: Simulated probability of moving to a switcher municipality (with a binding notice
period). Local linear smooth of the probability that an individual chooses to move to a switcher
municipality over the moving date separately from both sides of the estimated threshold date,
and using a bandwidth of 60 days.
exact date when the jump materializes is not known. We, therefore, apply a regression
discontinuity design with unknown discontinuity points to test whether the relationship
features a discontinuity and to determine its position. This method is discussed in detail
in Section 4 on the empirical strategy. For the particular run of the simulation, there is
a discontinuity at t = 442 for the notice period scenario.
Re-estimating the relationship using LLS separately from both sides of the estimated
threshold, we find in Figure A.2 that the probability of choosing a switcher municipality
features a clear negative jump at the threshold value. To gain an idea why the jump
mostly appears when a notice period is considered, we decompose the distributions of the
moving dates. We separate between individuals who decided to relocate before the new
information entered the system and those who decided to relocate afterwards. Figure A.3b
shows the resulting densities for the scenario considering a notice period. We see that
the estimated threshold date is temporally close to the point in time at which the movers
who decided on the basis of the new information outweigh those who decided without it.
Furthermore, the densities show steep slopes just before the threshold date. Thus, the
change in the composition of the population regarding individuals with and without the
new information occurs quite abruptly. The transition period in the baseline scenario, see
Figure A.3a, is wider. The densities have a less steep slope in the period after the new
information is released. This explains why the effect materializes much more smoothly
than in the scenario with the notice period in most simulation runs.
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Figure A.3: Composition of the pool of individuals moving regarding their information level.
Kernel density estimates.
In a last step, we repeat the procedure of drawing a population and testing for the presence
of a jump in the resulting moving pattern 500 times. Table A.1 summarizes the results
of this simulation. We find a discontinuity in 82 percent of the draws in the notice period
setting. In contrast, it is only found in about 26 percent of cases in the setting with search
frictions alone.
Table A.1: Test results for discontinuities detected in simulated data
Mean SD Min. Max. N
Without notice period
Discontinuity detected 0.26 0.44 0 1 500
Threshold 399.04 31.01 360 499 128
τ at threshold –0.16 0.11 –0.29 0.26 128
With notice period
Discontinuity detected 0.82 0.38 0 1 500
Threshold 440.84 13.72 360 495 412
τ at threshold –0.23 0.08 –0.42 0.36 412
Note: Summary of simulation results, once without notice period and once considering a notice period
of 90 days.
The regression discontinuity method with unknown discontinuity points thus seems an
appropriate econometric technique for analyzing information effects on moving patterns
in a context with notice periods.
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B Results
Figure B.4: Campaign poster in support of the minaret initiative.
Figure B.5: Local media reporting about the vote on the minaret initiative. The excerpt of an
article from the Swiss newspaper Tages-Anzeiger entitled "Land sagte Ja, Städte Nein" shows
how the outcome of the vote on the minaret initiative was visualized in the press.
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Figure B.6: Local media reporting about the vote outcomes at the voting district level. The
graph was presented in the Swiss newspaper Tages-Anzeiger in the article entitled "Warum die
Schwamendinger anders ticken als der Durchschnittszürcher", it depicts the outcome of the vote
on the minaret initiative at the level of voting districts within Zurich.
Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean SD Median Min Max N
Switcher and Non-switcher municipalities in 2009
Switcher 0.24 0.43 0 0 1 2,515
Mean vote shares former
All 50.82 12.6 52.48 13.98 85.33 2,515
Switcher 46.05 9.93 47.01 13.98 64.08 612
Non-switcher 52.35 12.98 54.82 14.8 85.33 1,903
Mean vote shares 2009
All 63.26 10.71 64.1 25 100 2,515
Switcher 63.34 7.18 63.55 50 87.5 612
Non-switcher 63.24 11.62 64.3 25 100 1,903
∆ =(vote share 2009 - mean vote shareformer)
All 12.44 7.57 12 -23.9 49.15 2,515
Switcher 17.29 7.25 17.14 3.25 49.15 612
Non-switcher 10.88 6.98 10.63 -23.9 39.08 1,903
rank change
All -0.3 48.39 -1 -294 299 2,515
Switcher 39.91 50.60 21.5 -8 299 612
Non-switcher -13.23 39.81 -6 -294 131 1,903
Notes: Summary statistics for the main variables for the municipality classification.
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Table B.3: Results for the specification test and the estimated threshold dates
Canton htest Tn T ∗n(90B) T
∗
n(95B) h Date cˆ
ZH 22.5 1.07 0.45 1.089 45 Jan 06, 2010
BE 22.5 2.245 0.559 1.702 45 Feb 06, 2010
SZ 37.5 4.768 0.796 1.751 75 May 13, 2010
NW 45 2.405 0.583 0.952 90 Dec 21, 2009
GL 45 0.777 0.38 0.764 90 Jan 08, 2010
SO 30 2.191 0.864 1.441 60 Mar 18, 2010
AR 45 3.327 0.837 1.398 90 May 16, 2010
GR 37.5 1.358 0.626 0.913 75 Mar 11, 2010
TG 30 2.624 0.272 0.796 60 Mar 02, 2010
TI 30 2.15 0.434 1.01 60 Mar 18, 2010
VD 22.5 1.866 1.46 2.442 45 Feb 18,2010
VS 30 2.471 0.348 0.625 60 Jan 08, 2010
Notes: Summary of the results of the RDD with unknown discontinuity points. We report the resulting
test value (Tn), the bandwidth used in the specification test (htest), the critical values on the 10 and 5
percent level, the bandwidth used in the threshold search (h) and the estimated threshold date (c) for
each canton. The bootstrap results are obtained using 1,500 resamples. The last column reports the
estimated threshold date.
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Figure B.7: Probability of moving to a switcher municipality in 12 cantons - RDD plots
around the estimated threshold dates. Local linear smooth, using the same bandwidth (h) as in
the estimations in Table B.4, of the probability that a foreigner chooses to move to a switcher
municipality over the moving date, separately from both sides of the threshold for all cantons in
which a discontinuity was found. The dashed vertical lines indicate the testing region, the first
solid line indicates the vote date, and the second the estimated threshold date.
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Table B.5: Results of the placebo specification test
Canton htest Tn T ∗n(90B) T
∗
n(95B) h Date cˆ
ZH 22.5 -0.695 0.294 0.655 45 -
BE 22.5 -2.227 0.248 0.672 45 -
SZ 37.5 -1.863 0.567 1.308 75 -
NW 45 -0.556 0.717 1.155 90 -
GL 45 -2.619 1.007 1.398 90 -
SO 30 1.229 2.265 2.752 60 -
AR 45 -0.249 0.674 1.228 90 -
GR 37.5 0.164 0.564 0.926 75 -
TG 30 -1.211 0.39 0.658 60 -
TI 30 -3.043 0.083 0.518 60 -
VD 22.5 -3.248 0.332 0.631 45 -
VS 30 0.369 0.437 0.76 60 -
Notes: Summary of the results of the RDD with unknown discontinuity points and a placebo testing
period (testing period -365 days). We report the resulting test value (Tn), the bandwidth used in the
specification test (htest), the critical values on the 10 and 5 percent level, the bandwidth used in the
threshold search (h) and the estimated threshold date (c) for each canton. The bootstrap results are
obtained using 1,500 resamples. The last column would report the estimated threshold date if the null
hypothesis could be rejected.
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Figure B.8: Number of individuals moving around the threshold. Local linear smooth of
the number of individuals who move over the moving date, separately from both sides of the
threshold, using a bandwidth of 90 days.
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Figure B.9: Number of individuals moving to a switcher municipality. Local linear smooth of
the number of individuals who move to a switcher municipality over the moving date, separately
from both sides of the threshold, using a bandwidth of 90 days.
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